



US Nuclear Policies: What Are They, What Else Might Help?

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U.S. Nuclear Policies-In Tension

Against

1. Heavy reliance on nuclear weapons for security
2. nuclear terrorism
3. global nuclear proliferation

For

4. Ability to ramp up US nuclear weapons capability quickly
5. Promoting US nuclear power
6. Discriminating among nuclear friends and competitors



1. Reducing US Security Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

- Moscow Treaty and continued nuclear deployment reductions
- Rejection of policies of nuclear mutual assured destruction (MAD)
- Open questioning of the Post Cold-War value of relying very heavily on nuclear deterrence to deal with undeterable actors



2. Increased Concern About Nuclear Terrorism

- After 911, Al Qaeda nuclear efforts, a New York/Washington strike?
- “Nexus” between terrorism and technology—A major Bush worry.
- Dirty bomb worries
- Administration support for CTR driven by materials security fears.



3. Desire to Combat Nuclear Proliferation Globally

- “Axis” = hostile, illiberal **nuclear**-arming states. Ultimate US desire is to make a globe full of Canadas
- War against Iraq justified as war against the future use and spread of WMD – especially nuclear weapons
- Interest in using UN and IAEA in efforts to contain other violators of the NPT, e.g., Iran and DPRK
- Proliferation Security Initiative, other efforts to back UN and other international nonproliferation institutions – Bush April NBC News Brokaw interview.

4. Interest in Being Able to Ramp Up Weapons Capabilities Quickly



- Funding ability to restart weapons production and testing more quickly
- Study merits of developing new, more useable nuclear weapons
- Retain right to redeploy nuclear weapons (e.g., US weapons in Afghanistan?) and to use them first against nonnuclear states



5. Desire to Promote Nuclear Power

- \$15 b. government guaranteed loan for next US power reactor customer
- \$60 b.-plus user fee for a government mandated nuclear waste solution
- “Supportive” NRC nuclear regulation
- Price Anderson nuclear insurance
- Gen IV and Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative plans for a “commercial” pyro-reprocessing plant
- \$4 b.-\$6 b.-plus MOX plant construction and recycling program



6. Inclination to Discriminate Among Nuclear Friends and Foes

- Rogues – Zero tolerance, e.g., Iran, DPRK, Syria, etc.
- Friendly non-NPT weapons states -- say no evil, e.g., Pakistan, Israel, India (to help in war against terror, the Peace Process, etc.)
- Allies -- all is allowed, e.g., Japan, Europe
- Part-time partners – bargaining and scolding, e.g., PRC, Russia
- Former or potential friendly proliferants –nuclear cooperation, e.g., Brazil, RoK, South Africa, etc.



Trying to Square the Tensions

- Between reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons (#1) and planning to breakout (#4), we claim we are merely preserving, not exercising our options
- Between worrying about nuclear terrorism (#2) and subsidizing nuclear power (#5), we emphasize how proliferation resistant our nuclear programs are
- Between wanting to fight proliferation globally (#3) and to discriminate (#6), we try to work with as many friends as we can to preempt worst proliferators



Why the Squaring Needs Work

- Merely preserving freedom of action shows a lack of commitment to any strategy and leaves one open to adopting the worst
- Proliferation resistance even of once-through cycle is questionable and subsidizing nuclear programs undermines our case against proliferators
- Favoring our so-called “friends” -- e.g., India, who is helping Iran, and Pakistan, who is helping DPRK and Iran, etc. – can easily fan more proliferation and undermine other, broader efforts, e.g., PSI



What Might Help

- Gilinsky-Wohlstetter-NPEC suggestions:
 - a. HEU-separated Pu and MOX production and use moratorium and related coop. (start with the backing of the willing).
 - b. Reinterpret, enforce NPT: Withdrawal illegal if near weapons capability is gained; View Articles 3, 4, 6 and 10 through lens of 1 and 2 rather than the reverse,
 - c. Toughen IAEA inspections/accounting of once-through systems, MAF, spent fuel, and lower evidentiary level for reporting violations.



What Else Might Help (0.1)

- Establish broader PSI rules as common international usage (i.e., UNSC res.), e.g.,:
 - preannounce all NSG and IAEA special nuclear material shipments
 - ban nuclear weapons redeployments on others' soil
 - consider ban on exports outside nonproliferation regime procedures



What Else Might Help (0.2)

- Follow *The Economist* (p. 12, 7/19/03) suggestion: Tax carbon emissions but let market decide electrical generating winners by assuring energy markets are entirely open to competitive bidding
- Crying foul in re Art. 4 when nuclear power deployments win over less costly bidders